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THE ONCE AND FUTURE FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
INTRODUCTION
The most recent brawl amongst federal land ranchers, environ-
mentalists, and bureaucrats to tumble through the louvered
barroom doors of the Supreme Court was Public Lands Council v.
Babbitt' (PLC), a challenge by federal land ranchers to federal
grazing regulation changes during the first term of President
William Jefferson Clinton.2 Inadvertently fingering the root source
of contention, Justice Breyer observed that the "enormity of the
administrative task"3 facing the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior (DOI) under the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) led to the
further delegation of rulemaking to the ranchers themselves back
in the 1930s,4 when the first Range Code was written.5 Whether
Justice Breyer meant enormity in the disfavored sense6 or in fact
adopted the warning of classic liberal economists and theoreticians
1. 529 U.S. 728 (2000).
2. See id. at 738.
3. Id. at 734.
4. See id. (observing that boards of ranchers provided the DOI with advice).
5. The Range Code is an amorphous beast given a shifting incoherence by successive
administrative agendas and a lack of central control over underlying policy. Karl N. Arruda
& Christopher Watson, The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 413,
424 (1997). For example, in 1976, over three thousand laws governed the Bureau of Land
Management's regulatory task. Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-
First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 377 (1994).
6. See THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN, Dos, DON'TS & MAYBES OF ENGLISH USAGE 73 (1977)
("Enormity, Enormousness ... Did [the writer under criticism] mean the wickedness, the
outrageousness, the monstrousness ...? Obviously not. But that's what enormity means. What
he had in mind was the vastness, the great size ... and the word he should have had in mind
was enormousness."); ROYH. COPPERUD, AMERICANUSAGE: THE CONSENSUS 86 (1970) (noting
that "93 percent of the American Heritage panel rejects ... the divergent sense of immensity,"
that "the Oxford English Dictionary defines enormity in the sense of excess in magnitude as
an incorrect use," and that the "consensus rejects the extended sense"). Perhaps Justice
Breyer, seldom a sloppy writer, harbors latent sentiments similar to those expressed by F.A.
Hayek in the footnote below.
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against the inherent flaw of planning,' his import was clear. The
Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) job-determining who should
graze how many cows on which particular allotments' out of the
more than 170 million acres of federal grazing land, and at what
price-looms enormous.9 It is complicated by the competing goals
of ranchers (to maintain or expand current grazing levels) and
environmentalists (to decrease or eliminate grazing), as both groups
have a say in the drafting of grazing regulations.
This Note argues that the BLM's judicially frustrated attempt to
abnegate its regulatory responsibilities in the 1980,7,1 along with
the holding of PLC that the BLM cannot lawfully transform itself
into a national wilderness reserve, have limited the BLM to the
narrow task of allocating grazing privileges and managing range
health. If the BLM were able to discharge this regulatory assign-
ment effectively, while complying with the statutory gamut of policy
goals, environmental and otherwise, it would have succeeded only
in providing a service which, although once perhaps necessary, has
become unnecessary over time. The common understanding being,
however, that the BLM has not and does not properly manage the
public range, this Note argues that the response to PLC has focused
wrongly on the efficacy or optimal mix of particular grazing
regulations and enforcement procedures. This Note offers a
different reading of PLC that goes instead toward a nonregulatory,
nonjudicial solution to the problem of the federal grazing lands:
their sale.
7. "There would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions so
simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant facts."
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 48-49 (1944).
8. Before Rangeland Reform '94, see infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text, and
probably thereafter as well, this decision was reached by "ocular estimation," meaning that
the local range manager used his personal ability to estimate carrying capacity to guide his
decisions. 3 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICESMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
§ 19:28 n.5 (1990); see also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1519 (1999) ("It is important to reiterate that there can be no truly
optimal environmental governance because resource management as well as public health
and ecological protection involve to some degree measuring the unmeasurable and comparing
the incomparable.") (emphasis added).
9. This Note abstracts the grazing issue from federal land management; the BLM's
other responsibilities relate to mineral resource administration. See 30 U.S.C. § 29 (2000)
(issuing mineral patents); 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (2000) (recording claims).
10. See discussion infra Part I.F.
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Part I outlines the history of the public domain, including a
discussion of the shift in policy from disposal to retention of federal
land holdings. Part II provides an overview of PLC. Part III surveys
the common interpretation of PLC, which was that it generally
affirmed the DOI Secretary's broad authority to regulate and that
improved regulations can indeed solve the problems of the public
range. Part IV then reviews some of the various proposals for range
reform, especially one particular proposal that argues for maintain-
ing federal land ownership and using lawsuits to achieve the policy
goals of interest groups and private citizens. Part V offers an
alternative solution based upon congressional reconsideration of the
retention-disposal choice as it pertains to federal grazing lands."
The choice between state and private ownership12 is a decision of
pure, albeit highly politicized, legislative policy.'" Ultimately, this
Note argues that private ownership would resolve outstanding
federal range issues without causing environmental disaster.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
A. Early American Land Distribution
Originally, the United States set out to transfer all of the "large
part of the vacant Western territory ... by cession at least, ... the
11. See Sally J. Kelley, Agricultural Law: A Selected Bibliography, 2001, 55 ARK L. REV.
303,379-82 (2002) (collecting thirty-four books and articles which address public lands issues
in terms of preserving recreational access, removing cattle from federal land, and so forth,
but none addressing the question of whether the federal government should retain BLM
lands).
12. See 1 HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 110-15 (1988) (discussing the communal, state, and private land
ownership alternatives). Demsetz noted "an owner of a private right to use land acts as a
broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the
present and the future." Id. at 111. Because of a failure to grasp the distinctions between
forms of ownership, the argument for privatization of public lands has been classified
incorrectly as "the ultimate act of decentralization" of management. See William E.
Riebsame, Ending the Range Wars?, ENVYr, No. 38-4, May 1996, at 27.
13. See Michael C. Blumm, Twenty Years of Environmental Law: Role Reversals Between
Congress and the Executive, Judicial Activism Undermining the Environment, and the
Proliferation of Environmental (and Anti-Environmental) Groups, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 14
(2001) (N[A] principal conclusion of this essay is how much politics matters in environmental
law.").
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common property of the Union" 4 into private hands as quickly as
possible. Although a few of the Founders argued for some federal
land retention,15 "lilt is certain that the Founding Fathers had no
intention of creating a large central government with huge land
holdings." 6 The original public domain came into being after the
seven colonies with western land claims acquiesced in the unified
demand of the six colonies without claims, 7 and ceded to the new
central government their western claims as a condition precedent
to ratification of the Articles of Confederation." Later, Congress
rewarded veterans of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and
the Mexican-American War with roughly sixty-one million acres of
land, or three percent of the U.S. landmass. 9
As the country grew through war, treaty, and purchase, so did
the area to be defended against internal and external threats. To
protect against foreign invasion, the government encouraged
citizens to settle the lands west of the Appalachians. 0 The presence
of cattle and sheep drovers decreased the threat of foreign occupa-
tion2 ' and helped suppress the Indians who otherwise would have
interfered more widely with transcontinental travel.22
The greatest increase in grazing use came during the Gold Rush;
heavy migration westward began in 1848, a year significant both for
the end of the Mexican-American War and the discovery of gold in
California. The disposition of federal lands unto the citizenry
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1961).
15. James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 241,247 n.32 (1994) (noting that President John Quincy Adams reserved oak forests
for naval use).
16. Karin P. Sheldon, The Thrilling Days of Yesteryear: Some Comments on the
Settlement of the West and the Development of Federal Land and Resource Law, S.F. 34
A L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 (2000).
17. Huffman, supra note 15, at 246 & n.18.
18. Virginia was landed, Maryland was not. See id. at 246 n.19.
19. Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of
Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1724
(1999).
20. GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 79 (1993);
see also PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE
FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 42, 76-79 (1981).
21. Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right To Graze Livestock on the Federal
Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 514
(1994).
22. Id. at 515.
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continued2" pursuant to the Homestead Act of 186224 and the Desert
Lands Act of 1877.25 The leading authority on federal land grazing,
George C. Coggins, finds a direct causal link between the "rapid
disposition of land" and the "patterns of western settlement that
still impede coherent land management."" The United States
continues to sell or transfer federal land, but at a relatively light
pace and through a different process. In contrast to its past direct
exercise of its Article IV, Section 3 powers,27 Congress now allows
agencies, with little oversight,' to exercise essentially unfettered
discretion in leasing and selling government lands.29
In the nineteenth century, homesteaders, especially in the arid
regions, staked claims around riparian areas, while grazing their
animals on federal land. 0 During the 1880s and 1890s, heavy
grazing began to curtail the range's regenerative capacity.3 '
Concurrently, public sentiment about federal land policy, influenced
by systemic abuses and fraud in the land disposal process, began to
shift.32
In 1872, Congress withdrew Yellowstone from the public
domain33 and these lands became national forest. Thereafter, the
23. See COGGINS ETAL., supra note 20, at 85 ("[Iun reality, large corporations got the bulk
of the available land through dummies and fraud to the federal government.").
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (repealed 1976).
25. 43 U.S.C. §§ 331-339 (2000).
26. George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1982)
(describing settlement and land distribution to individuals and corporations such as railroads
during westward expansion).
27. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,539 (1976) (asserting that Congress' Article
IV powers are "without limitation[]"). Whatever arguments might be raised against
disposition, there is emphatically no barrier to Congress short-circuiting legal challenges. See
United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (holding that claims arising from the disposal of
public lands are within the jurisdiction of the courts only if Congress allows); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 607
(Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1992) (same).
28. "The [Administrative Procedure Act] exempts property transactions from rulemaking
constraints, and courts and agencies have limited third party access to much adjudication."
Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1710.
29. Id. at 1707.
30. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:2.
31. See id.
32. Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's
Planning Process, 26 ENVTL. L. 771, 784 (1996).
33. Act of March 1, 1872, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2002).
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western United States consisted of three components: public lands"'
grazed freely by all, privately claimed lands, and lands withdrawn
from settlement. In 1890, the Supreme Court held that Congress,
by its silence, had given anyone wishing to graze animals on the
public lands the right to do so." This was convenient for homestead-
ers, who "did not want title to ... the western range ... [except for]
the best parcels.""6 Debra Donahue has asked the question as the
homesteaders did: "Why pay taxes on these grazing lands if the
federal government [would] allow their use for no charge or only a
pittance?"37 That is to say, there would be no federal grazing today,
and none of the attendant regulatory disputes, if Congress had
made taking title the rationally preferable, economically viable
choice.
B. Range Overcrowding and the Dust Bowl
Congress closed the public domain under the TGA and parceled
out limited grazing privileges because of decreased available forage
caused by (1) range overcrowding and (2) the Dust Bowl.3" After a
successful congressional experiment with a restricted access
grazing district in Montana in the early 1900s,"9 ranchers through-
out the West asked Congress to expand the system.' ° DOI Secretary
Harld LeClair Ickes" overcame whatever residual resistance to the
34. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting the
"millions of acres of unappropriated public lands in the western states, including Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming"); DYAN ZASLOwsKY & T.H. WATKINS, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 135 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing public land as "the land no one wanted") (quoting William P. Clark, an Interior
Secretary during the Reagan Administration).
35. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 332 (1890).
36. Debra L. Donahue, Justice for the Earth in the Twenty-First Century, 1 WYO. L. REV.
373, 390 (2001).
37. Id.
38. See E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND
RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-1950, at 218-20 (1951).
39. The success of the grazing district implies a continuum of the number of users from
high optimality--one or few users-to low optimality-unlimited users. At high optimality,
further distinction could be made between sole users who do or do not have residual rights,
such as personal ownership and the right of free alienability.
40. See PEFFER, supra note 38, at 215.
41. Ickes served under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman from 1933 to 1946.
1808 [Vol. 45:1803
FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
TGA remained by promising to charge grazing fees sufficient only
to recover administrative costs. 4 2 Ranchers, at least those who
obtained grazing privileges, thus avoided the consequences of
communal property without incurring the responsibilities of private
ownership.
The Dust Bowl, a term referring to an environmental disaster
emanating from 150,000 square miles in the contiguous corners of
Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas between the
years 1933 and 1939, was the consequence of heavy sodbusting by
farmers anxious to capitalize on high grain prices.43 When the
abnormally high rainfall of the 1910s and 1920s 41 gave way to
drought, winds swept significant amounts of topsoil into the air.4
One dust storm in 1934 dumped "sands from Western deserts ...
[onto] the sidewalks of New York and sifted them down around the
dome of the [U.S.] Capitol."4'
This environmental catastrophe is frequently mentioned as a
force behind the TGA, passed soon after that particular 1934 dust
storm.47 Just as frequently, it is omitted that the Dust Bowl was
rehabilitated by 1941.48 One explanation for this omission is that
the range's quick recovery weakens the trump card-that of
inevitable earthly disaster-in the hands of those who prefer the
outcome if environmental and federal land policy decisions are
made with greater rather than lesser precaution. The dubious
cause/effect understanding of the current grazing system, that the
42. Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 26, at 71-72. Today grazing fees do not
cover administrative expenses and most of the BLM's fee revenue is transferred back to state
and local governments. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:44; see also CHRISTOPHER
MCGRORY KLYZA, WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC LANDS? MINING, FORESTRY, AND GRAZING POLICIES,
1870-1990, at 128 (1996) (showing BLM grazing fees from 1935 to 1985 peaked in 1980 at
$2.36/AUM). Some conclude the federal fees are actually "equivalent to private [pasture]
rates when services and investment differences are accounted for." Riebsame, supra note 12,
at 9. Others disagree and blame range degradation on "below-market prices reduc[ing]
ranchers' incentives to manage rangeland wisely." Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1733.
43. See 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 497-98 (1999).
44. ROBERT H. NELSON, PuBLIc LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 30 (1995).
45. See PEFFER, supra note 38, at 220.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id. (noting, however, that the "dust storms received little mention in the
Senate debates on the grazing bill").
48. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 498 (1999).
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"West had been turned into wastelands due to their unregulated
use ... [and that] the abuse forced the federal government to change
its land policy from one of disposal to one of federal retention and
management, " 49 takes too narrow a view of the situation as it was
then and is now. Missing from this view are the considerations that
(1) in private hands land is not necessarily converted to wasteland
due to unregulated use50 and (2) it was not the disposed, but the
undisposed, lands which Congress retained for management and
which have done so poorly.51
C. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
The uncodified Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) preamble specified
three purposes: preventing overgrazing and soil erosion, stabilizing
the "livestock industry dependent upon the public range," and
providing for the "orderly use, improvement, and development" of
the public grazing lands.52 The TGA gives the DOI Secretary
authority to "establish grazing districts or additions thereto and/or
to modify the boundaries thereof, of vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved lands from any part of the public domain of the United
States. 53 Congress originally intended for this authority over the
public lands to be temporary, "pending its final disposal.""
Congress created the Division of Grazing5 within the DOI and
transferred to it about half of the land the BLM now manages.'
The permits issued under the TGA were based on the permittees'
49. Laura Scales, Note, Grazing Our School Endowment Lands: Idaho Watershed Project
v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 385, 388 (2000)
(citing E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL & RESERVATION
POLICIES 214-44 (1972)).
50. See DEMSETZ, supra note 12, at 53-54.
51. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
52. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
53. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
54. Id.
55. See DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH
36-37 (1983) (stating that the BLM replaced Division of Grazing after about ten years); see
also Gary D. Libecap, Bureaucratic Opposition to the Assignment of Property Rights:
Overgrazing on the Western Range, 41 J. ECON. HIST. 151 (1981) (discussing competition
between Agriculture and Interior Departments for jurisdictional control of public domain
between 1920 and 1934).
56. See FERGUSON & FERGUSON, supra note 55, at 37.
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actual use from 1929 to 1934"v and required that the permittee own
near or adjacent "base" property. 8 The TGA provides that while
grazing privileges on public land must be "adequately safeguarded,"
the permit itself can never create a "right, title, interest, or estate
in or to the lands."59
In practice, the ranchers implemented the TGA themselves
through stockmen's advisory boards.60 Winners of the adjudication
process obtained grazing privileges that in practice closely resem-
bled land ownership rights, insofar as the permit holder held a ten
year, automatically renewable, essentially rent-free right to an
amount of forage corresponding to the amount of forage produced
by a comparable parcel of privately owned pasture.6' Adjudication
winners obtained this, as noted, without assuming the property tax
consequences of land ownership.
D. Natural Resource Defense Council v. Morton
The legal turning point for BLM livestock grazing programs
came in 1974 when the District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered the BLM to prepare one Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for each of its 144 grazing districts, pursuant to Environmen-
57. See Coggins & Lindeberg.Johnson, supra note 26, at 58 n.397.
58. Mandatory Qualifications, 43 C.F.R. § 4110. 1(a) (2002) (requiring "base" property as
a mandatory permit qualification prerequisite).
59. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000).
60. PAULFOSS,POLITICsANDGRASS 98-200(1960); see also COGGINS &GLICKSMAN, supra
note 8, § 19:8 (noting that "[plermittee ranchers, through grazing advisory councils and
general political clout, were able to dictate BLM management priorities to a considerable
extent") (citations omitted); CULHANE, supra note 20, at 85 (stating that advisory boards were
created because the BLM considered primarily local constituent opinion); Nolen, supra note
32, at 776 (arguing that local advisory boards "reinforced the relationships between BLM
field staff and local individuals and groups, and created an agency orientation toward
satisfying local needs"). The advisory boards actually "wrote the Range Code and established
the preference permit system before the Congress authorized their existence in 1939."
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:11.
61. Permits entitle the permittee to a certain number of AUMs, or Animal Unit Months.
An AUM is enough grass, 750-800 pounds, to feed one cow or five sheep for one month.
George Cameron Coggins,Law ofPublic Rangeland Management V: PrescriptionsforReform,
14 ENVTL. L. 497, 531 n.184 (1984). "Managers have calculated that every AUM licensed
actually costs the government about five or six dollars [in administrative expenses]."
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:44 n.2.
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tal Protection Act (EPA) dictates.62 In actions brought under the
citizen suit provisions of the EPA, courts will enjoin the use of land
because of an insufficient or missing EIS.6" Twenty-five years after
the decision, the BLM had yet to survey ninety million acres of its
federal land holdings.64 In Morton, the court held that a single
nationwide plan would not adequately account for regional differ-
ences in geography and climate.6" The court originally ordered the
BLM to produce 212 separate EISs, but reduced the number to 144
(one per district) and later, after the BLM had failed to meet its
deadline, extended the schedule to complete them until 1988."
E. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the Public
Rangelands Improvement Act
Although grazing dropped by forty-five percent between 1955 and
1996,67 overgrazing continued to prevent the range from achieving
ideal forage cover. In 1976 Congress enacted the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 8 because the range was not
healthy in spite or because of forty years of federal management. 9
FLPMA explicitly superseded the policy announced in the TGA of
62. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 840-41 (1974); COGGINS
& GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (requiring all agencies
to prepare reports describing "the environmental impact of the proposed action," "any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided," "alternatives to the proposed
action," "the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity," and "any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented" whenever the proposed action might "significantly affect[] the
quality of the human environment").
63. See, e.g., Eric Montalvo, Comment, Operational Encroachment: Woodpeckers and
Their Congressmen, 20 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 219, 224 n.16 (2002) (collecting cases).
64. Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1714.
65. Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 423 (citing Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 838-39, 841).
66. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Andrus, 448 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (D.D.C. 1978).
67. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140, 155 (1999).
68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000). The FLPMA injected new interests into the BLM's
management calculus. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1983).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b)(1) (2000) ("Congress finds that a substantial amount of the
Federal range lands is deteriorating ... and that installation of additional range
improvements could arrest much of the continuing deterioration .... ").
[Vol. 45:18031812
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dispossessing the government of the public domain.7" FLPMA
instructed the Secretary to manage the range for multiple uses:71
economic, recreational, and scientific;72 and to achieve the goal of
sustained yield--"achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a
high-level of annual or regular periodic output of the various
renewable resources of the public lands consistent with multiple
use."73 Finally, the FLPMA ordered production of land use plans
covering all federal land.74
Two years after FLPMA, Congress passed the Public Rangelands
Improvement Act75 (PRIA), which contained findings that the range
was no healthier than before76 and that the solution was "intensive"
management 77 and a "significant increase in ... funding."78 At that
70.
Until the FLPMA expressly stated in 1976 that federal policy was one of
retention in federal ownership of the rest of the public lands, the question of
possible eventual federal relinquishment was an open one; all remaining federal
lands were "pending final disposal" in the hopeful sense in which the phrase
apparently was used. Furthermore, as discussed above, the TGA does allow for
disposal of lands in districts, but also expressly states that lands are not to be
subject to the disposal laws until the lands are reclassified to make them so.
Pamela Baldwin, Livestock Water on Federal Rangelands, 1 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES
J. 351, 403 (1996).
71. Multiple use's "heyday" began in 1930 and ended in 1970. Laitos & Carr, supra note
67, at 149-50.
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(aX7), 1702(c), 1732(a) (2000); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 (D. Nev. 1985) (holding that a multiple use mandate is not
grounds for injunction against grazing).
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (2000); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).
74. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2000); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp.
848, 857 (E.D. Cal. 1985), affd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the goals of the
FLPMA).
75. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (2000).
76. Id. "[R]anching can damage the range ecosystem through a'slow, insidious process.'"
Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 419 (citation omitted). The range which is damaged slowly
recovers slowly.
77. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908. But see Karl Hess Jr. & Jerry L. Holechek, Beyond the
Grazing Fee: AnAgenda for Rangeland Reform, Cato PolicyAnalysis No. 234 (July 13,1995),
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-234.html (arguing that "decisions by self-interested
bureaucrats lead to inherently unstable private use rights to the range" and that the
"associated insecurity of tenure results in non-optimal land use and lower long-term levels
of production").
78. See 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(4) (2000); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1901(aXl), (3) (2000) (finding
that"vast segments" of public range are in "unsatisfactory condition" and therefore "present
a high risk of soil loss, desertification," and consequent underproductivity).
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time, 7000 BLM employees 79 managed 14,000 permittees8 s The
PRIA decreed the primary goal of range management to be forage
productivity enhancement, consistent with land use plans,8' but
also through reduction of permitted livestock. 2
F. Natural Resource Defense Council v. Hodel
For a short time during the early 1980s, the sometimes anti-
regulatory Reagan administration experimented with Cooperative
Management Programs (CMPs)."8 A permittee party to a CMP was
allowed to manage his share of the range "essentially as [he chose],
without grazing limits, accountability, or penalties.' The CMP, in
fact, was the mere codification of the reality of on-the-ground
grazing management. "Neither active policing of livestock grazing
nor punishing permittees for violations," states Coggins, "have been
high public priorities in western ranching communities."' Never-
theless, upon the challenge of environmental organizations, the
District Court for the Eastern District of California had no difficulty
nullifying the CMPs as a plain and illegal abnegation of the BLM's
statutory responsibility to regulate specific seasons of use, number
of cattle per area, and the like.' Two years later, the Ninth Circuit
79. KLYZA, supra note 42, at 125.
80. Marion Clawson, Multiple-Use Considerations, in MANAGING PUBLIC LANDS IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 21,26 (Benjamin C. Dysart III & Marion Clawson eds., 1988). In 2001, the
BLM had 11,629 employees. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL CIVILIAN
WoRKFoRCE STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND TRENDS AS OF SEPTEMBER 2001, at
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/etsept01.pdf. In 2002, just over 18,000 leases and grazing
permits were in force. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2002, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, Table
3-9c, available at http:J/www.blm.gov/natacq/plsO2. All but 1.5 million of the nation's 120
million cows did not graze on public lands in 1980. Steve Johnson, BLM's Grazing Program
Is a National Scandal, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Dec. 23, 1985, at 15. Ten percent of permit
holders graze ninety percent of BLM lands. JAN G. LArToS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 8.01,
at 265 (Hornbook Series 2002).
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1903(b) (2000).
82. Id.
83. KLYZA, supra note 42, at 133-34. CMPs are also known as Cooperative Management
Agreements (CMAs).
84. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:9; see also 43 C.F.R. § 4120.1 (1985)
(explaining cooperative management agreements).
85. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:8.
86. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 869-70 (E.D. Cal. 1985),
affd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
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affirmed, 7 the practical result of which has been that so long as the
BLM has taken care in preparing a district's EIS, an environmental
plaintiff may not challenge negligent or wrongful management of
the land in that district.88
G. The 1990s and 2000s
Although Professor Joseph Feller has shown how the "BLM's
written and unwritten policies and procedures ... placed substantial
barriers in the path of' those members of the public wanting to
participate in the BLM decision-making process during the 1980s, 9
Coggins has identified three trends in the 1990s signaling a change
in direction."° Congress and interest groups watered down the
"program of somewhat radical change"91 to the Range Code that
DOI Secretary Bruce Babbitt propounded, but the trend in the BLM
itself towards considering nongrazing values and the increasingly
pro-environmentalist decisions of administrative law judges92 and
Interior Board of Land Appeals have continued.93 Nevertheless,
87. Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Hodel, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
88. LAITOS, supra note 80, § 8.01, at 266-67 (discussing the Hodel decision).
89. See Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands: Opening the Process
to Public Participation, 26 LAND& WATER L. REV. 571,576 (1991) (decrying exclusion of, and
lack of notice to, public regarding BLM permit renewal decisions); see also Krent & Zeppos,
supra note 19, at 1711 ("Public participation, however, should be encouraged in adjudications
in which nonfinancial concerns, whether programmatic or distributional, play a part.").
Professor Feller's interest in public lands ranching surpasses the merely academic. See Feller
v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. UT-06-89-02 (1990) (granting Feller standing in an
administrative proceeding as an affected interest in his effort to enjoin grazing in sensitive
areas).
90. "The harder BLM line against offenders, the recognition that some environmental
concerns and values must be weighted in the process, and, especially, the 1995 regulations
premised on rangeland health, all point in the direction of less grazing and more amenity
protection." CoGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:46.
91. Id. § 19:19.
92. See, e.g., Natl Wildlife Fed'n, 151 IBLA 66 (1999) (reversing BLM decision to permit
grazing at wilderness area spring because BLM disregarded state law preventing damage
to "unique waters'); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. UT 06-01 (1993)
(holding BLM violated law by renewing grazing permit); Fellerv. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No.
UT-06-89-02 (1990) (finding EIS deficient under NEPA for want of site specific analysis;
remedy was to suspend grazing until EIS complete).
93. CoGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8, § 19:20 ("[Tlhe agencies have embarked on
oblique attacks against traditional grazing 'rights,' and the judicial bodies largely concur.").
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Congress's vision of "rational, scientific, step-by-step management,"
as the FLPMA and PRIA requires, remains elusive.94
H. Federal Lands Ranchers Today
"[D] own from [twenty] million head in 1900," western ranchers
in 1998 ran fewer than two million cattle on the public domain. 95
About 70% of cattlemen in the West own all the land their herds
graze on; 22% have federal grazing permits." Federal land ranchers
typically graze cattle on permit lands in the spring and summer,
then move them to private pasture for the balance of the year.97
About 3000 (10%) of permittees "control" 50% of BLM acreage in the
continental United States.98 Permittees have no property interest
in the land itself or in the permit which grants license to use the
land.9 9 Western communities are not financially dependent on
public lands ranching."0 Typically one rancher/permittee uses each
BLM allotment.0 1 By and large, federal lands ranchers ranch not
for income but because "they enjoy the lifestyle." 2
94. Id. § 19:46.
95. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 155. The public domain yields 2% of feed consumed
by cattle in the United States. Joseph M. Feller, TV the Cows Come Home: The Fatal Flaw
in the Clinton Administration's Public Lands Grazing Policy, 25 ENVTL. L. 703, 704 (1995).
96. Donahue, supra note 36, at 392-93. For an overview of the different kinds of ranchers
who utilize the public domain, see Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 456-57.
97. All public lands ranchers must own private land; cattle still must be fed once the
grass dies back in the fall. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 154.
98. Timothy Egan, Wingtip "Cowboys" in Last Stand To Hold On to Low Grazing Fees,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,494 (1973) (holding "no compensable
property right can be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of
the permit"); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding "grazing
preferences that are attached to fee simple property are not compensable property interests
under the Fifth Amendment"); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428,430-32 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (finding
that permittees have no license or vested interest in land).
100. Donahue, supra note 36, at 392 (discussing communities in the Southwest).
101. Joseph M. Feller, Back to the Present: The Supreme Court Refuses To Move Public
Range Law Backward, but Will the BLM Move Public Range Management Forward?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10021, 10033 n.165 (2001).
102. Donahue, supra note 36, at 390.
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I. Summary of Federal Grazing Land's History
The American government began dispensing the western lands
freely or cheaply under the presumption that it would increase the
wealth of the new nation and provide additional, nonmilitary
protection against foreign occupation. The choicest parcels of land
were easily disposed of while the poorest parcels went unclaimed.
Because the unclaimed lands were open to public use, a tragedy of
the commons scenario unfolded which led to the closure of the
public domain and the establishment of the federal grazing program
in 1934. This program developed into today's BLM grazing system
under which ninety percent of about 175 million acres of BLM land
is foraged under private leases and permits. Increased pressure
from private citizens since the 1970so'0 has led to statutory and
regulatory provisions under which the BLM theoretically must
consider both the impact of grazing upon particular areas and
alternative land uses such as recreation. The continually high
volume of environmental litigation answers in the negative the
question whether the new laws have had their intended effect.
II. PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL V. BABBITT
In the first Clinton administration, DOI Secretary Bruce Babbitt
announced his intention to mend the Range Code.' He had made
clear his view that ranching was not the best use of the public
domain before his appointment.0 5 Babbitt sent a copy of Rangeland
103. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
104. The main points of the plan went to raising fees, placing environmentalists on
advisory boards, eliminating "preference,' reducing permit longevity for permittees not
improving their allotments, taking over state water rights, charging subleasing permittees
higher fees, and establishing national permittee standards. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 8, § 19:22; see also Departmental Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative
Relations; Grazing Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pts. 1780 & 4100) (stating that the purpose of regulations was to "ensure proper
administration of livestock grazing on the public rangelands").
105. The "most productive use of Western public land will usually be for public
purposes--watershed, wildlife and recreation." James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban
Archipelagoes in the American West: A New Reservation Policy?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1, 30 (2001)
(reprinting remarks of then-Governor Babbitt to Sierra Club); see also Carl M. Cannon, The
Old-Timers, 1999 NAT'L J. 1386,1390 (stating that "environmentalists' strategy was to place
high enough hurdles in the paths of ... cattle growers to make ... cattle grazing on arid and
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Reform '9416 to those likely to be affected or interested in the
plan,10 7 read reply letters from over 8000 people,1"8 and held twenty
meetings with "western governors, State and local officials,
ranchers, environmentalists, and other public land users" before
publishing proposed rules in March of 1994.09 The DOI published
the final rules in February 1995 with an effective date of August 21,
1995.110 Babbitt's proposed tripling of the grazing fee, to just under
$4 per month per animal, fell out before Congress approved the
final rules.' Considered by some the centerpiece of the reforms,
Babbitt called for Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) n2 comprised
of representatives from the ranching industry, environmental
groups, and state/local governments to advise the DOI on the state
of individual grazing districts."" The RACs would make policy
recommendations to the DOI Secretary who could follow or
disregard them. 114
The Public Lands Council (PLC)" 5 sued on July 27, 1995,116 to
enjoin enforcement of the new regulations, indicating Babbitt's
understandably limited success in drafting regulations accommo-
dating all of the concerns voiced in the twenty meetings he con-
ducted and 12,600... letters he received.
easily damaged public land unprofitable. Then the land could be taken out of production, and
set aside for conservation....').
106. For a review of Rangeland Reform '94, see Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 428-46.
107. Departmental Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. at 9894 (35,000 copies distributed).
108. See id.
109. Departmental Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,314 (Mar. 25, 1994).
110. Departmental Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. at 9894.
111. See Hess & Holechek, supra note 77.
112. See infra note 151.
113. Resource Advisory Councils-Requirements, 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(a), (h) (2002).
114. See id. § 1784.6-1(i) (noting the procedure if the DOI Secretary arbitrarily disregards
the RACs' advice).
115. The Public Lands Council tracks public lands issues on behalf of the National
Cattleman's Beef Association. See Anita P. Miller, Public Lands and Waters: Who Will
Prevail-Man or Beast?, 31 URB. LAW. 883, 885 (1999).
116. Regional News Briefing, DEN. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 28, 1995, at 10A.
117. Departmental Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. act 9894.
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A. Wyoming District Court
In the Wyoming District Court, PLC sought the declaration that
several of the 1995 Regulations were unlawful.118 District Judge
Brimmer reviewed the regulatory changes under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), which requires "uphold[ing] agency action
unless it is arbitrary and capricious, exceeds statutory authority, or
violates the Constitution.""9 The regulations would fail only if they
were "arbitrary and capricious," had "no rational basis," or if the
BLM did not "consider important relevant factors."12
The court first held that Babbitt exceeded his statutory authority
under the TGA by replacing the term "grazing preference" with
"permitted use"12' because it endangered ranchers' presumptive
grazing privileges, instead of safeguarding them, which the
Secretary has an affirmative duty to do under the TGA.122 Although
the government argued the change was solely one of form, 12 the
court stated that the "term 'permitted use' ha[d] no connection to
the painstakingly adjudicated 'grazing preferences'" referred to in
the TGA and that it "eliminate[d] the adjudicated grazing prefer-
ences."
124
118. Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior Sec'y, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (D. Wyo.
1996), affd, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 1440 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994)).
120. Id. (citing Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Dep't of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032, 1037 (10th Cir.
1995)).
121. Id. at 1441. Before 1995, grazing preference meant the total number of animal unit
months [AUMs of livestock grazing on public lands apportioned and attached to base
property owned or controlled by the permittee or lessee." Definitions, 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5
(1985). After 1995, it meant "a superior or priority position against others for the purpose of
receiving a grazing permit or lease. This priority is attached to base property owned or
controlled by the permittee or lessee." Definitions, 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (2002). Permitted use
means "the forage allocated by, or under the guidance of, an applicable land use plan for
livestock grazing in an allotment under a permit or lease and is expressed in AUMs." Id.
122. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1440-41 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994) and
Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742 (10th Cir. 1949)).
123. Id. at 1440.
124. Id. at 1441. "[IThe Department of Interior engaged in a lengthy adjudication process
to determine who was eligible for a grazing preference. This process began in the 1930's and
took nearly 20 years to complete." Id. at 1440.
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After upholding a regulation requiring good land stewardship as
a precondition to permit renewal, 2 ' the court disallowed the
government's taking title to "structural range improvements (like
fences, wells, stock tanks, and pipelines) on public lands" 2 " paid for
and installed by permittees because it "exceed[ed] statutory
authority and lack[ed] a reasoned basis."'27 The DOI's "expressed
desire to return to common law precepts about ownership,"2 '
although perhaps admirable from a disinterested, administrative
tidiness perspective, was inconsistent with congressional intent as
indicated by certain provisions of the TGA'" and FLPMA.i 0
The 1995 Regulations added "conservation use" to the list of uses
constituting "active use."'' The court struck down this regulation
because the
125. Id. at 1441-42 (upholding Mandatory Qualifications, 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1-1(bXl)
(1995)).
126. Id. at 1442.
127. Id. at 1443. The government also took title to "non-structural range improvements
such as seeding, spraying, and chaining." Cooperative Range Improvement Agreements, 43
C.F.R. § 4120.3-2(c) (2002).
128. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1443. The court cited 60 Fed. Reg. 9897 for the
proposition that at common law, "permanent improvements [were retained] in the name of
the party that [held] title to the land." Id. at 1442. Here, the court wrongly concluded that
the government's common law argument failed on its own terms because "the range
improvements usually could be severed from the land without adversely affecting the land
... Itiherefore the permittee ... would still hold title to the improvements."Id. at 1443. But see
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (7th ed. 1999) (defining tenant's fixture as "[riemovable
personal property that a tenant affixes to the leased property but that the tenant can detach
and take away"). Among 'fences, wells, stock tanks, and pipelines," only a stock tank is a
tenant's fixture. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. If the stock tank had to be
mounted by helicopter, it would not be a tenant's fixture, either, insofar as either the
installation or removal cost exceeded the value of the tank.
129. See 43 U.S.C. § 315c (2000) (allowing permittees to construct range improvements
on public lands and requiring successor permittees to compensate constructor of range
improvements for reasonable value).
130. See id. § 1752(g) (requiring compensation to holder ofcancelled permit for his interest
in range improvements if cancellation was so land could be devoted to other use).
131. Compare Definitions, 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1985) (containing no definition for
conservation use), with Definitions, 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (2002) (defining conservation use
as "an activity, excluding livestock grazing"). The BLM uses a device similar to conservation
use, a reduction in the permitted number of cattle called "suspended nonuse," to rest
overgrazed range, but the suspended AtTMs are almost never reactivated. Feller, supra note
101, at 10028.
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[TGA] is, as its name indicates, a grazing act .... The [TGAI ...
does not authorize the Secretary to issue permits allowing
permittees to remove public lands from grazing for ten-year
periods .... Such permits ... circumvent the decision Congress
made when enacting the [TGA] that certain lands were best
suited for grazing.'32
The Tenth Circuit upheld this ruling3 and the government did not
appeal to the Supreme Court. Of the six challenged regulations,
only this provision for conservation use permits had any significant
chance of providing a useful tool to environmentalists opposed to
federal range administration.
After upholding permit cancellation triggered by three consecu-
tive years of nonuse, 34 the court disallowed the deletion from the
permittee qualification provisions that the applicant be "engaged in
the livestock business." 3 ' The government argued the change was
necessary so banks and conservation groups could obtain permits;
the court stated that they already could.3 6
In addition to the challenged grazing and permit regulations,
PLC also objected to the Fundamentals of Rangeland Health,
which instructs range managers to ensure the health of water-
sheds and riparian areas,'37 maintenance of or progress towards
healthy "[elcological processes, including the hydrologic cycle,
nutrient cycle, and energy" cycle," compliance with state water
quality standards, 39 and maintenance or restoration of habitats for
132. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1443. In fact, Congress was not so much deciding
that certain lands were best suited for grazing as it was indicating that certain lands were
not good for much else.
133. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999).
134. See Cooperative Range Improvement Agreements, 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g)(2) (2002).
The government said available, unused, and therefore unpaid for AUMs cost it $1,000,000
in 1984. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1444.
135. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1444-45 (citing frustration of congressional
intent). Compare Mandatory Qualifications, 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1995), with Mandatory
Qualifications, 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (2002), and Base Property, 4110.2-1(aX1) (2002).
136. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1445 (citing Forgey Ranch Co. v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 116 IBLA 32 (1990) (granting permit to bank engaged in livestock business) and
Defenders of Wildlife, 19 IBLA 219 (1975) (granting permit to environmental group engaged
in livestock business)).
137. Fundamentals of Rangeland Health, 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1(a) (2002).
138. Id. § 4180.1(b).
139. Id. § 4180.1(c).
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threatened and endangered species. 140 The court found that the
BLM adequately complied with public notice and public comment
period rules.14 '
B. Tenth Circuit
Unlike the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit applied Chevron principles." 2 On the government's appeal,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on three of the four
appealed rulings. The court upheld the order invalidating the
provision allowing issuance of conservation permits.143 It reversed
on the "grazing preference" versus "permitted use," title to range
improvements, and mandatory qualifications regulations. 1"
On the permitted use issue, the court found that it did not
conflict with an unambiguous statute" and that the "district court
erred in characterizing the permitted use rule as deviating from
past regulation" as "the Secretary [had] long had the authority to
specify permitted grazing use upon the renewal of a permit.""46
C. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in upholding
Babbitt's changes to the definition of "preference,"" 7 the elimination
of the engaged-in-livestock-business requirement,'" and the grant
of title in future range improvements to the United States."9 The
140. Id. § 4180. 1(d).
141. Pub. Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1448.
142. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287,1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
143. Pub. Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1289.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1294.
146. Id. at 1298.
147. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 745-47 (2000).
148. Id. at 747-48. The Court rejected the argument that nonranchers would get permits
and "mothball" them. Id. at 747. The TGA authorizes the Secretary to issue permits only to
"bona fide settlers, residents, and other stock owners"; the regulation did not override the
TGA's requirement of stock ownership. Id. at 745.
149. Id. at 750. Ranchers, however, are free to contract with the BLM around this
regulation. See id.
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DOI did not appeal the Tenth Circuit's holding on the conservation
use permits.1'5
The Court's decision in PLC has two important components. The
first component is that it affirmed the broad discretionary powers
the Secretary enjoyed in carrying out his duties. This was mani-
fested by the three upheld regulations. The second component of the
decision was the limitation the Court recognized upon the ends to
which the Secretary may direct his broad discretionary power. After
PLC, the Secretary's deliberations of conservation vel non are moot
until Congress modifies or repeals the TGA.
III. RESPONSE TO PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL V. BABBITT
After Rangeland Reform '94 was announced and before PLC
reached the Supreme Court, three views emerged regarding
Babbitt's regulatory overhaul. First, that the regulations signaled
the dawn of a new era-an era of cooperative land management' 5 1-
second, that the BLM was warming to ecological holism,1 5 2 and
150.
The ranchers' underlying concern is that the ... regulations ... allow individuals
to "acquire a few livestock ... obtain a permit for what amounts to a
conservation purpose and then effectively mothball the permit." But the
regulations do not allow this .... New regulations allowing issuance of permits
for conservation use were held unlawful by the Court of Appeals ... and the
Secretary did not seek review of that decision.
Id. at 747 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
151. Tom Meling, Bruce Babbitt's Use of Governmental Dispute Resolution: A Mid-Term
Report Card, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 57, 80 & n.129 (asserting that RACs were the
.centerpiece" of Rangeland Reform '94); Todd M. Olinger, Comment, Public Rangeland
Reform: New Prospects for Collaboration and Local Control Using the Resource Advisory
Councils, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 633,635 (1998) (calling Rangeland Reform '94 "the first sketch
of a process by which complex and deeply conflicting public interests may be incorporated
into meaningful land management reform"). But see Hess & Holechek, supra note 77
(arguing that "councils would be largely cosmetic" and lack "power to change how decisions
about public lands are made, ... the breadth of membership needed to truly open
decisionmaking about federal lands to broad public participation, and ... the lines of
accountability and responsibility that are essential to good land stewardship and protection").
152. Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 459 ("[Rleforms will introduce the concept of
Leopold's 'ecological conscience' into public lands management."); Bruce M. Pendery,
Reforming Livestock Grazing on the Public Domain: Ecosystem Management-Based
Standards and Guidelines Blaze a New Path for Range Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 513, 525
(1997); see also Brian L. Frank, Comment, Cows in Hot Water: Regulation of Livestock
Grazing Through the Federal Clean Water Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1269, 1308 (1995)
(positing that regulations should have focused on riparian area use under Clean Water Act
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third, as Professor Feller and others criticized, the reforms did not
go far enough because they failed "to admit that substantial
portions of the public lands are poorly suited to livestock production
and therefore should be retired from grazing in favor of other
resources and uses.""a ' Additionally, there was discussion of
ranchers' recalcitrance and resistance to government oversight. 154
The PLC discussion, range administration not having changed
spectacularly in the five interceding years, assumed a technical
tone. Four views of the decision were advanced.
A. Upholding the Secretary's Discretion Under the TGA
Without citing Chevron, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding
of the Tenth Circuit that the Secretary had not exceeded his
discretionary power.1 5 PLC was received as a predictable "reitera-
tion of well-established principles," the principal among principles
being the Secretary's relative freedom to manage the range as he
sees fit.156
B. Harbinger of Environmentalism Taking Root at the BLM
The BLM's first topdown pro-environment agenda came from
Babbitt, although President Carter had attempted similar reforma-
authority).
153. Feller, supra note 95, at 712. Hess and Holecheck concurred, predicting failure
because the "new rules ... offer no substantial change in the institutions and policies that
have fostered and promoted degradation of public grazing lands for the past 125 years." Hess
& Holechek, supra note 77 (arguing for a market, not judicial or regulatory, solution); see
also RICHARD MANNING, ONE ROUND RIVER 62 (1997) (stating that American cattle are not
bred for arid climates).
154. Robert H. Nelson, Government as Theater: Toward a New Paradigm for the Public
Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 335, 338 n.24 (1994); Phillip Stover, Note, Three Congressional
Mandates, an Environmental Impact Statement, and the Bureau of Land Management: Can
an Old Dog Be Taught New Tricks?, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 311 (1997).
155. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 739-50 (2000).
156. See also Andy L. Adams, Annual Administrative Law Survey, 23 U. ARK. LrrTLE
ROCK L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2001); Allen E. Shoenberger, October Term, 1999: The Supreme
Court's Last Term of the Twentieth Century, Increasing Deference toAdministrativeAgencies,
21 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 213, 223 (2001); Ryan Waterman, In Brief, 28
ECOLOGYL.Q. 552,554 (2001). But see Julie Anderson, Note, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.
Herding Ranchers Off Public Land?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1273, 1302-03 (arguing that 1995
regulations violated the TGA).
[Vol. 45:18031824
FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
tory efforts. Hopeful of a reordering of priorities at the BLM flowing
from Babbitt's tenure,"5 7 several writers stressed the importance of
PLC on the future willingness and ability of the BLM to consider
seriously the best use of fragile or alternatively valuable range."S
C. Regulatory Platform
As noted, the commonplace of the Secretary's broad discretion
was the predominant aspect of PLC. From there, commentators
suggested other discretionary regulations' 9 and congressional
actions to reform the grazing program such as raising fees to reflect
market value"6 or ability to pay,16 1 removing cattle entirely from
arid lands to comply with FLPMA, 162 encouraging those involved in
the use of federal grasslands to think like Indians, 63 or adopting a
presumption that regulatory/statutory reform should reflect a
supposed original intent of the TGA: binding local communities to
the land.164 The reception of PLC, all in all, was a perfect example
of how "often, little attention gets paid to the opportunities to
design rules ... [that] thereby eliminat [e] the need for regulation."65
157. Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Moving Beyond Public Lands Council v. Babbitt- Land Use
Planning and the Range Resource, 16 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 139,202 (2001) (noting that "the
potential for this momentum to build upon itself is significant").
158. John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary
View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199,222 (2001); Lois J. Schiffer & Sylvia Quast, Public Lands Litigation
in the Geography of Hope, 1 WYO. L. REV. 413, 425 (2001); Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note
157, at 202.
159. "Better environmental results depend ... on improving regulatory performance." Esty,
supra note 8, at 1495.
160. Michelle M. Campana, Student Article, Public Lands Grazing Fee Reform: Welfare
Cowboys and Rolex Ranchers Wrangling with the New West, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 452
(2002). But see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 856 (E.D. Cal. 1985)
(observing that TGA only requires fees be reasonable).
161. See Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 457.
162. Donahue, supra note 36, at 388; see also Shannon Rigsby, Public Lands Council v.
Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior: Challenging the Evolution of Public Lands Grazing
Regulations, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 161, 175 (2001) (asserting that the "state
of the commons now dictates the number of animals allowed, instead of the other way
around").
163. See Schiffer & Quast, supra note 158, at 425.
164. See Rasband, supra note 105, at 83.
165. Esty, supra note 8, at 1498.
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IV. PRoPOSALs To SOLVE THE RANGE PROBLEM
The economically predictable problems attending public owner-
ship of an asset privately used, and contemporary environmental
concerns, converge in BLM lands to create a tricky problem. On the
one hand, federal land ownership provides a central pressure point
upon which environmentalists and recreational land users can exert
disproportionate influence over how land use decisions are made
and, thereby, what the decisions are. Privately owned land,
dispossessed land such as it is, is not so susceptible, except in cases
where nuisance or trespass actions or statutorily created private
causes of action (for example, to remedy environmental harm)
might lie. On the other hand, because of PLC's clear holding that
the BLM cannot be a conservatory agency, environmentalists can
pressure the BLM litigiously only so far before the discretionary
limit provided by the TGA prevents further marginal benefit from
such pressure.
The proposals for resolving the range problem share in common
several tenets. First, permittees have a bare license to graze cattle,
which is revocable at the BLM's discretion after certain procedural
requirements are observed. In other words, if the BLM were to end
or curtail grazing, affected ranchers would not have takings claims.
Second, the BLM historically prefers the interests of ranchers over
the interests of the environment. Third, federal grazing does not
contribute significantly to national food production'66 and, there-
fore, could be done away with altogether. From these understand-
ings proceed three main reformatory themes, periodically refined
over the last several decades.
A. Reforming the Regulations
Two groups of commentators have addressed the range misman-
agement problem in terms of regulatory reform, those who prefer
federal ownership of BLM lands and those who have accepted
continued federal ownership as inevitable. In the latter group,
166. Feller, supra note 95, at 704 (noting that BLM land produces two percent of cattle
feed nationwide; one BLM cow requires one hundred or more acres of forage compared to just
one acre in the eastern United States).
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adjusting the fees to represent market value is perhaps the most
commonly suggested solution, the theory being ranchers could not
afford environmentally damaging ranching practices in a quasi-
competitive system. 6
7
Babbitt's RACs promised to open the decision-making process to
the public and facilitate dialogue and understanding between
commodity users and recreational or conservationist users of BLM
lands. The problem with the RACs is that, although the point is not
universally taken, people can have disagreements unreconcilable
through dialogue.1"e Regardless of whether the RACs were theoreti-
cally sound, 1 9 they seem to face difficulties in implementation. For
example, Arizona's RAC has never complied with the membership
requirements and generally has had no environmentalist represen-
tatives. 1
70
Two other problems with regulatory reform are its costs and the
slow process by which reform comes. Recently, the U.S. House of
Representatives allocated $826,932,000 for general BLM expenses
and another $230 million for the payment in lieu of taxes
167. Arruda & Watson, supra note 5, at 457 (arguing that "the government could establish
different fee rates and perhaps different regulations or standards for different size ranches").
168. "The natural approach to human relations presumes that to know any person well
enough is to love him ... [that] the only human problem is a communication problem. It
refuses to admit the possibility that people might be separated by basic, deeply held,
genuinely irreconcilable differences-philosophical, political, or religious." JUDITH MARTIN,
COMMON COURr: IN WHICH MISS MANNERS SOLVES THE PROBLEMS THAT BAFFLED MR.
JEFFERSON 12 (1985).
169. "The legislative and judicial processes giving us the evolving corpus ofenvironmental
statutes during the past 20 years have reinforced the belief that citizens have a right to
participate in federal decision making which affects the environment." Don L. Klima, The
Consequences of Change Without Dialogue: An Historic Preservation Perspective, in
MANAGING PUBLIC LANDS IN THE PuBLIc INTEREST, supra note 80, at 99, 102 (emphasis
added). Passing over the violence this belief does to the republic/democracy distinction, the
logistical implications are stupefying. See also Riebsame, supra note 12, at 28 (categorizing
environmentalist view of RACs as being'no more likely than the bureaucracy to address the
thorniest range problem-[overgraing]").
170. See Resource Advisory Councils, Requirements, 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(c), (d) (2002)
(stating that councils are to consist of ranchers, environmentalists, and public figures, with
'balanced and broad representation from within each category"); Feller, supra note 101, at
10035 & nn.197-98 (noting that "meetings are sometimes forums for bashing
environmentalists, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and agency decisions that offend
ranchers").
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program.'71 In October of 2000, the BLM estimated that it would
need $500 million between 2000 and 2010 to update all 144 land
use plans.'72 Many existing land use plans pre-date the Clinton
administration. 7 3 Moreover, various laws have mandated different
kinds of management plans including RMPs, 7 4 HMPs, 175 and
AMPs. 17 This expensive and unwieldy policy-generating mecha-
nism has not yet produced compliance with its own administrative
requirements, let alone successful improvement of environmental
quality on BLM lands.
B. Buying Out the Ranchers
Some environmental groups have sought alternatives to lobbying
the BLM or Congress or suing to achieve what they deem to be
appropriate public domain use. A few such organizations have gone
into ranching for the sake of obtaining grazing permits and
managing their allotments with environmental responsibility.'77
171. H.R. 5093, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002). The BLM wants $1.7 billion for 2004. See
Bureau of Land Management, News, Feb. 3,2003, available at httpJ/www.blm.gov/nhp/newa/
releases/pages/2003/pr030203_budget.htm.
172. Congress authorized $19 million in 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-291 (Oct. 11, 2000).
173. See Feller, supra note 101, at 10034 n.178.
174. In 1976, Congress ordered the BLM to prepare one Range Management Plan (RMP)
for each grazing district. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000). By 1993,just over half had been completed.
Nolen, supra note 32, at 815. In 1987, the BLM estimated the cost of preparing one RMP at
$450,000. David C. Williams, Public Land Management: Planning, Problems, and
Opportunities, in THE PUBLIC LANDS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE 20TH CENTURY:
PLANNING, LAND, AND POLICY IN THE FEDERAL LAND AGENCIES 22 (1987). When the RMPs
will be finished, if ever, is unclear. In 1993, the BLM moved its target date from 1997 to 2013
to complete all 144 RMPs. Nolen, supra note 32, at 815. When 2013 arrives, many of the first
RMPs completed will be outdated.
175. The Sikes Act required Habitat Management Plans (HMPs), which are low level BLM
plans that address wildlife conservation. 16 U.S.C. §§ 670g-670o (1994). The BLM had
written four hundred HMPs for fifty million acres of its land by 1985. BLM, FISH & WILDLIFE
2000: A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 11 (1987). In 1996, the BLM's budget justifications indicated
it would update sixty of them. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Budget Justifications, F.Y. 1995, 3-57
(1995).
176. Allotment Management Plans (AMPs), required with every permit issuance and
renewal, are tailored to particular parcels. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752 (2000).
177. See Jason S. Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129,
186-87 (2001):
Groups such as the Nature Conservancy have in fact already begun to play such
a market-making role by virtue of their involvement in both negotiating and
enforcing Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act and
1828
FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
This applaudable approach requires substantial dedication.
Although private market transactions that circumvent the BLM's
permit system are in some cases disfavored by the government, 178
the BLM does appear to sanction one new approach which combines
private and public transactions to remove cattle from sensitive
areas. In the typical transaction, a private organization approaches
a permittee and offers to pay him the profit value of his permit if
the permittee will "support an amendment to the applicable land
use plan terminating grazing on the public lands covered by the
permit."179 An alternative method for buying out ranchers to remove
cattle from public lands, offered by Donahue,"8 would feature
ending grazing outright, and offering "deserving public-land
ranchers transition payments, conservation easements or incen-
tives, and/or purchase options." 81 These approaches, although
possibly achieving the limited goal of stopping further range
damage in some locations, do nothing to address either the
bureaucratic waste problem or the proper allocation of actual use
rights. On the other hand, privately owned, freely alienable land
will presumptively wind up in the possession of the user who values
it most highly.
wetlands mitigation agreements under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Further expansion in the role played by such groups is not only likely but a
crucial element of effective privatized provision.
Id.
178. See COGGINS & GLIcKSMWN, supra note 8, § 19:7 (discussing BLM documentation of
(illegal] grazing permit sales at multiples of the AUM rate).
179. Feller, supra note 101, at 10038. The Grand Canyon Trust "has negotiated to remove
cattle from over 325,000 acres of BLM land in southern Utah." Id. at 10038 n.237; see also
Leshy, supra note 158, at 222 (observing that "in an increasing number of fragile
areas-especially in the hot deserts of the Southwest--grazing is being eliminated
altogether, through consensual buyouts ofprivate ranches funded by nonprofit conservation
groups").
180. Removing cattle from riparian areas could have an immediately beneficial impact on
"60 to 80% or more of western vertebrate species." Donahue, supra note 36, at 395. Donahue
argues that "current federal law would authorize, if it does not actually mandate, the
removal oflivestock from arid public lands to prevent irreparable ecological damage to those
areas." Id. at 387. Donahue, curtseying to realpolitik, does not attempt to reconcile the
argument that the law requires the BLM to remove cattle from the public range with her
suggestion that ranchers be bought off.
181. Id. at 395.
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C. Litigating Against the Government
Private lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against the federal
government, in the absence of physical sickness or financial harm,
are a relatively recent cultural phenomenon. The most enthusiastic
environmentalists argue that, properly pled, no case motivated by
good environmental intentions is unwinnable as a matter of law.' 82
Of especial popular appeal are cases involving animals."' The last
thirty years'8 ' have seen "dramatic increases in Endangered Species
Act litigation, regulatory takings cases, and challenges to national
forest management. " 18 5 This wave of litigation has greatly altered
the BLM's decision-making process.'"M The approaches activists
take vary, from Earthfirst! announcing its goal of removing cattle
from all federal land by 1993"87 to a single hiker seeking standing
as an "affected interest" so as to enjoin grazing on a particular
182. For example: "Properly framed, federal regulation of either dredge and fill activities
or discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States, no matter how broadly defined,
is well within Congressional Commerce Clause authority .... " Richard J. Lazarus,
Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 653,
662 (2002). "[Tlhere is something distinctively'environmental' about environmental law and
the Court's increasing inability to appreciate that dimension was leading to more poorly-
reasoned decisions and results [between 1970 and 1999].* Id. at 655.
183. 'Wildlife ... provides what may be termed'psychic' benefits. Many species, such as the
panda and the tiger, occupy a special place in people's hearts and minds." Nolen, supra note
32, at 780 (saving observation from irrelevance to the United States by also including the
bald eagle).
184. The era ofthe environmental plaintiff began with the Supreme Court's 1972 decision
in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (holding that environmental plaintiff met
the standing requirement by alleging he made recreational or aesthetic use of the resource
in question).
185. Schiffer & Quast, supra note 158, at 417; see also Gary D. Libecap, Competing for the
Rental Value of Federal Land: The Assignment of Use Rights and Their Regulation, 1 CATO
J. 391, 400 (1981):
In the 1960s recreation and conservation groups began demanding access to
federal land and restrictions on livestock use. As zealous, cohesive groups, they
lobbied for voter and congressional backing. Because they weakened the
political power of ranchers, conservationists supplemented the attempts of
bureaucrats within the Department of the Interior to expand the BLM's role.
Id.
186. See Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1753.
187. Earthfirst Group Says to Shoot Cows; Drug-sniffing Dogs on Overdosing, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A4.
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grazing allotment."M Given the continuing growth in the number
of wild animal activists," 9 outdoor enthusiasts, 90 and the annual
increase of young, idealistic lawyers going into environmental law,
"regional and local proliferation [of environmental groups who] have
decided that they must litigate to be taken seriously ... is likely to
continue."'9 '
Environmental plaintiffs suing the BLM face two hurdles before
having their arguments heard, one being the standing require-
ment 192 and the second is the DOI Secretary's and the BLM's broad
discretion under Chevron. '" The Tenth Circuit alone has dealt with
over four hundred standing and discretion cases.' 9 ' So long as the
188. Donald K Majors, 123 IBLA 142 (1992) (holding that hiker in area has an affected
interest).
189. Usually it is about wolves. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, the Fourth Circuit upheld as a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause power an ESA regulation which forbade landowners from
killing red wolves on their land. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). The court relied on the
substantial effects test defined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The private sector can solve the
wolf-spillover cost problem. For instance, Defenders of Wildlife maintains a fund from which
it reimburses private losses by predator animals. See Schiffer & Quast, supra note 158, at
414. Wolves can turn ranchers into environmentalists, or perhaps just ranchers in
environmentalists' clothing. See Miller, supra note 115, at 890-91 (reporting that "eleven
Mexican gray wolves set free ... on the Arizona/New Mexico border have become a symbol of
the conflict between ranchers (and environmentalists] .... The pice de rdsistance is the
argument [of ranchers] that the wolves will take food away from the Mexican Spotted Owl
.... [Rianchers say that they 'derive substantial enjoyment' from the spotted owl"),
190. Some say that BLM lands, aside from their general desolation, also include areas of
scenic canyon, desert, and mountain vistas. See generally EDWARD ABBY, DESERT SOLITAIRE:
A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS (1968).
191. Blumm, supra note 13, at 13.
192. ZYGMUNTJ. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 398 (2d ed. 1998). For a discussion of standing as defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court, see Andrew C. Lillie,Agency Law Barriers to Successful Environmental and Natural
Resources Litigation: Tenth Circuit Approaches to Standing and Agency Discretion, 78 DENv.
U. L. REV. 193, 195-200 (2000). "Environmental cases provide the backbone of the Supreme
Court's efforts to refne standing requirements during the last thirty years." Id. at 196.
193. PLATER ETAL., supra note 192, at 430.
194. Lillie, supra note 192, at 194. The cases generally involve "agency decisions about
popular local issues." Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, cracked down in the 1990s on
environmental plaintiffs failing to take seriously the standing requirement. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (emphasizing the standing requirements);
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,875 (1990) (holding environmentalist cannot sue
until BLM makes a decision about a grazing district and that a plaintiffmust allege that his
own use and enjoyment of the land suffered thereby). In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), the Court upheld a citizen suit
under the Clean Water Act seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties, thereby reversing the
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government owns land upon which it suffers continuing capitalist
undertakings, be they grazing, mining or whatever, it would seem
that this flood of litigation will continue.
V. RESURRECTING THE PREJUDICE TOWARD A FINAL DISPOSITION
PLC stands for the proposition that the BLM cannot manage
public lands for conservation. Moreover, as has been persuasively
argued, multiple use management is and has been a practical
impossibility.19 On the other hand, some argue that multiple use
suffers not from impossibility but rather from "increasing irrele-
vance" and thus should be replaced by management for two goals:
preservation and recreation. 96 Much as with managing for multiple
use, however, managing for both preservation and recreation
creates problems. For example, preservation and recreation users
conflict over the use of motorized vehicles, especially snowmobiles
and four wheelers, in national parks and on public lands.197
Jan Laitos and Thomas Carr have argued that the multiple use
doctrine is outdated and that the two dominant uses which have
replaced resource extraction on the public lands-recreation and
preservation-should be the ends of land management policy.'98
Laitos and Carr conclude that (1) the majority of public land value
lies in its preservation and recreation value and (2) preservation
and recreation users do not view their respective uses as entirely
compatible.' Although Laitos and Carr by no means advocate a
final disposal of the public lands, a final disposal would accomplish
the shift from extraction to recreation/preservation, assuming
Laitos and Carr rightly compare the relative use values.2" In light
Court's trend toward stricter standing requirements. It was a "significant victory for the
environmental community." Lazarus, supra note 182, at 658. Justice Ginsburg, for the Court,
held that an environmental plaintiff suing over pollution need only "aver that they use the
affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will
be lessened." Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183.
195. Cf Hardt, supra note 5, at 386 (asserting that "multiple use is a viable land
management directive as long as it is implemented within an ecologically sound framework").
196. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 165.
197. See, e.g., Schiffer & Quast, supra note 158, at 414.
198. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 143-44.
199. Id. at 144.
200. Feller would agree that Laitos and Carr have made an accurate comparison. "The
economic value of the recreational use of BLM land alone far exceeds the value of the
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of the continued failure of the BLM to achieve its statutory
mandates, and the problems inherent in attempting to implement
an effective management scheme, Congress should embark upon a
new course, or rather, return to its original course. After reserving
some lands with relatively high recreation and conservation
value-to be administered by various national and state level
park/wilderness agencies-Congress should order the remainder of
the public domain to be sold at auction. 0 1
A. Problems with the Land Disposal Process
Serious structural inefficiencies arising from the lack of incen-
tive to maximize revenue in a bureaucratic organization inhere
in the sale of U.S. public assets.0 2 As noted,"8 public policy shifted
towards retaining some federal lands not just because of ineffi-
ciency, but because of outright inequity and fraud in the land
disposal process. Criminality seems to have marred much of the
transfer of North America's landmass into private hands.2 '
Congress has not yet implemented laws which ensure that agencies
sell public assets for their true value, 5 nor does it seem likely that
such legislation is even possible, insofar as the administrative cost
of the additional oversight would have to be counted against the
livestock forage that the same land provides." Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the
BLM's Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 559
(1994).
201. Two conditions on this solution are that the government should retain mineral rights
and that a substantial percentage of riparian BLM lands should go into park or wilderness
agency management.
202. "Below-market dispositions of government assets likely rob taxpayers of billions of
dollars each year." Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1780; see also Esty, supra note 8, at
1510 ("[Rlegulatory bodies may operate inefficiently or ineffectively. Bureaucracies in general
and government entities in particular frequently lack incentives to act otherwise.").
203. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
204. For example, Richmond, Virginia's capital city, is built upon land given by the "most
successful of the Indian traders," the patriarch whose descendants sat in the Virginia
legislature for most of three and one half centuries, William Byrd I. SOPHY BURNHAM, THE
LANDED GENTRY 68 (5th ed. 1978). As the Commonwealth's escheator, Byrd acquired over
forty square miles of land (26,000 acres) and held on by forgiving himself the taxes. Id
205. See, e.g., Nicholas G. Vaskov, Continued Cartographic Chaos, Or a New Paradigm
in Public Land Reconfiguration ? The Effect of New Laws Authorizing Limited Sales of Public
Land, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 79, 87 (2001) (discussing a Nevada land exchange
wherein, "after completing an exchange with the BLM valued at $763,000, the private party
turned around and sold the same 70 acre property for $4.6 million').
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sale price. Although the order to sell the public lands must initially
come from Congress, the actual sale should be conducted by a
private firm with a stake in maximizing sale price. Compensation
via commission would maximize this incentive.
B. Past Attempts to Create a Disposal Scheme
In 1982, Steven Hanke argued that the federal government
should privatize grazing lands by transferring surface rights2" to
current permittees at a price based on future rental value to the
government, less rent paid.20 7 Hanke based this argument on the
IRS's recognition of grazing rights as a taxable component of a
decedent's estate20" and the banking sector's willingness to collater-
alize permits.2" He proposed two possible privatization methods,
either an option of first refusal auction or a straight public
auction.210 In both scenarios, ranchers would receive credit for the
value of their "lease-hold" rights, either as a credit against the
purchase price, or as compensation under a quasi-paid-in-capital
theory if another party purchased the land. 11 He concluded that the
DOI and Department of Agriculture should apply "genuine asset
management" and overcome the bureaucratic tendency toward
206. Transferring only the surface rights would avoid complicating the disposal with
mineral prospecting. Robert H. Nelson has taken this a step further, arguing for the creation
of freely transferable property interests in the grass itself. See Robert H. Nelson, How To
Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 645 (1997).
If forage rights were defined and made legally transferable to any new owner,
environmental organizations could purchase the forage rights to federal lands
that are now available only to ranchers. Environmental groups seeking to
reduce livestock grazing on federal lands would have a realistic way to
accomplish their goals, other than by seeking to influence the exercise of
government commands-and-controls. A clear delineation of rights would also
encourage existing ranchers to invest in long-run improvement and productivity
of the federal rangeland ... but by the competitive workings of the marketplace.
Id. at 690.
207. Steven H. Hanke, The Privatization Debate:An Insider's View, 2 CATOJ. 653,657-58
(1982).
208. Id. at 657.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 658-59.
211. Id.
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"asset hoarding" by requiring the privatization of lands returning
less than a real 10% rate of return.212
Two issues with Hanke's proposal are that the weight of'judicial
authority clearly indicates that ranchers do not have any "paid-in-
capital" rights to rent money paid in exchange for federal land use
privileges or any right to demand or receive the right of first
refusal. Second, keying privatization to a 10% real rate of return
would be a de facto decision to privatize all BLM grazing lands.
Even highly productive farm and pasture lands return less than
10% per annum. Additionally, a problem would arise in attempting
to value the land, in the absence of a market to set the price. The
government, through the very bureaucrats with the "asset hoard-
ing" tendency, would set the land's value, and set it artificially low
to maintain its sphere of power.213 A third, derivative problem,
caused by the asset valuation problem, arises from the increasingly
well-funded environmental groups who stand willing and able to
purchase BLM lands simply to remove cattle from them. If the BLM
set land values artificially low in order to meet its 10% target,
environmentalists foreseeably could challenge the valuations by
alleging willingness to pay more than the BLM's valuation. On the
other hand, valuing the land at anywhere near its true market
value would rile political opposition in the Senate, which favors
rancher interests.2 4
To illustrate further, a 10% return on 177 million acres valued at,
arguendo, $38 an acre exceeds $670 million per year.215 In 1993, the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior generated less than $35
million in grazing fees combined.2 6 To meet a 10% target in 1993,
the BLM would have had to value its land at less than $3 an acre.
212. Id. at 662.
213. See, e.g., Hess & Holechek, supra note 77 (noting that "[tien million dollars was spent
by the federal government between 1985 and 1994 to study fair-market-value grazing fees
.... [whatever fee is arrived at ... will be the outcome of political rather than market forces").
214. See, e.g., Robert H. Smith, Livestock Production: The Unsustainable Environmental
and Economic Effects of an Industry Out of Control, 4 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 45, 116 (1996)
(noting Senate's opposition to grazing fee increase in 1994).
215. One estimated value of BLM and Forest Service lands is $160 billion. CATO
INSTITUTE, CATO HORNBOOK FOR CONGRESS, 105TH CONGRESS, 296 (1997).
216. Nelson, supra note 207, at 664-65; see also Hess & Holechek, supra note 77 (noting
that BLM fee revenues totaled $20 million in 1994). In 2002, grazing generated $13 million
in revenue. ANNUAL REPORT, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 17 (2002), available at
http.//www.blm.gov/nhp/info/stratplan/AR02.pdf.
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Clearly, capitalist or environmental groups would clear the federal
land market of 177 million acres at $3 an acre.
One rough proxy useful for valuing the public lands is the
amount spent by users on traveling to and using them. Gross
national product attributable to expenses tangentially related to
outdoor recreation on the Forest Service's (192 million acres) and
BLM's (177 million acres) combined 369 million acres is $140 billion
per year.217 Using the proportional fraction of $67 billion as a proxy
for the value of the BLM's holdings, a 10% return target translates
into $6.7 billion per year, over 190 times the BLM's 1993 fee
revenue.
C. Reconciling the TGA and FLPMA Presumptions with the
BLM's Failure To Successfully Manage the Range
In the TGA, Congress presumed that the secretary would
temporarily parcel out privileges until the disposition.. of the
remaining lands mooted the tragedy of the commons problem.
Then, in the FLPMA, Congress adopted a policy of retention while
authorizing disposition in three limited circumstances.219 The third
and relevant circumstance is that any "tract, because of its location
or other characteristics is difficult and uneconomic to manage as
part of the public lands and is not suitable for management by
another Federal department or agency" may be sold by the DOI
Secretary.220 Although some argue that the policy shift reflected
Congress' desire to "prevent undue commercial development" 1 of
the public lands, this explanation is at best no more likely than the
hypothesis that Congress desired to increase or maintain the size
of the federal power pie.
Congress has not foreclosed the possibility of selling off the public
range, and yet the mechanism by which disposal occurs clearly
217. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 146 (noting recreational use of public lands is
responsible for $140 billion of GNP).
218. Today, congressional talk of"disposition" relates to fee money, not land. See, e.g., 147
CONG. REC. 1680 (2001) (statement ofRep. Hefley) (discussing the"disposition of grazing fees
arising from use of such lands").
219. Authority, 43 C.F.R. § 2710.0-3(a) (2002).
220. Id. § 2710.0-3(aX3).
221. Laitos & Carr, supra note 67, at 173.
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militates toward retention.222 If, on the other hand, Congress
adopted the attitude that the BLM is unnecessary and inefficient in
disposing of the public domain, Congress could capitalize on
environmental nonprofit organizations' time, resources, and most
importantly, their motivation to actually inventory the public
domain as the BLM should have done under its myriad legislative
mandates.228 That is, by ordering the auction of the public
domain-after reserving whatever parcels at the state and federal
levels for parks and other such uses-Congress reasonably could
presume that these organizations would purchase much of the
public domain, especially those parts that should not be grazed.
Likewise, ranchers could obtain private sector financing to purchase
land that is viable ranchland.224
There is no colorable private legal objection to Congress taking
this path. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, the Supreme Court reiterated its
past holding that private citizens do not have standing to sue the
federal government for its decision to dispossess itself of land.225
CONCLUSION
Federal administration of the public rangelands no longer serves
a necessary purpose. Neither the public at large, public lands
ranchers, environmentalists, nor the government have a legitimate
need for this land to remain under federal control that could not be
more efficiently met through the market. Indeed, principles of
efficiency and fairness require the termination of federal dominion
over an asset that can be administered for the benefit of only a few.
222. Congress passed recent legislation specifically enabling land managing agencies to
sell land and retain the proceeds to enlarge federal conservation land holdings. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (2000); 43 U.S.C. § 2301 (2000).
223. For an example of environmental groups uncovering mismanagement of riparian
and watershed areas in Idaho, see Idaho Watersheds Project u. State Board of Land
Commissioners, 982 P.2d 371 (Idaho 1999) (holding that the state unconstitutionally excluded
land bids from an environmental group trying to obtain grazing lands for nongrazing
purposes).
224. Banks make loans to ranchers based on the market value of grazing permits.
225. 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (upholding government's power to give land to private, religiously
affiliated college). The Court rejected standing based on taxpayer status, id. at 476-82,
regardless of whether the land transfer violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 469; see
also supra note 27.
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The beneficiary of the windfall may reap his loot in the form of
discounted pasture, to the disadvantage of the majority of beef
growers in the United States who pay full fair market value to raise
their cattle. Or the beneficiary may enjoy free solitude, natural
beauty, and the company of wilderness beasts. The cost to the
public is the same. Equally unfair is the burden borne by the public
in supporting the BLM fiefdom. The probability of a BLM chief
voluntarily conceding the uselessness of his agency and calling on
Congress to undertake the process this Note proposed is extremely
low.
The impetus to divest must come from Congress. Congress
should excuse the BLM from the process of identifying lands to be
sold because the BLM could not legitimately be expected to execute
the task with dispassion.226 In 1968, the BLM reviewed its land
holdings for retention or disposal pursuant to the Classification and
Multiple Use Act of 1968. Surprisingly, the BLM concluded that two
percent of its land holdings should be liquidated or otherwise
managed by a different agency. 227 Although this Note concludes that
this figure was low by a factor of about fifty, the BLM's self-analysis
was a step in the right direction. Congress should rededicate itself
to the path originally taken by the United States and remove itself
from the litigation-prone and unproductive business of public lands
ranching.
S.L. Rundle
226. Krent & Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1771-72 (arguing that "Government disposition
programs, particularly when they are not framed on market principles, require greater public
participation and more public scrutiny" and nominating the Office of Management and
Budget to do the monitoring); see also Vaskov, supra note 205, at 79 (quoting a congressman
that said the BLM gets "snookered" when it negotiates land exchanges).
227. The surprise was that it was not zero percent. Veronica Larvie, Federal Land
Planning Issues: Ecosystem Analysis, Forests, Oceans, and Public Lands, S.F. 34 A.L.I.-
A-B.A. 127, 131 (2000). As has been noted:
Once assets are under government ownership and control, they are viewed by
bureaucrats as being free-nothing must be given up for the assets' use and
retention.... ITihere are no bureaucratic or budgeted benefits that flow from the
liquidation of government property. But, there may be significant costs to
bureaucrats from public asset liquidation. For example, if the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forest Service liquidated the lands they
manage, they would significantly reduce their employment opportunities and
growth potentials, since the Forest Service's and BLM's raison d'dtre is to
manage federal land.
Hanke, supra note 207, at 660.
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